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Trade and the Environment: Dialogue of the Deaf
or Scope for Cooperation?
Michael Hart*
Sushma Gera**
The task of statesmanship is... to attempt to guide the nations, with
all their differences in interest, power and fortune, towards a new system more capable of meeting the "inner limits" of human needs for all
the world's people and of doing so without violating the planet's resources and environment.
The Cocoyoc Declaration
I s it possible for a trade negotiator and an environmental regulator to
work together on the same file? This may strike some as a flippant
question. It is not meant to be. Indeed, over the past few years, it has
become a pressing question that deserves serious consideration.
In suggesting that environmental regulators must learn to share
their file with trade negotiators, our purpose is not to be presumptuous,
but rather practical and realistic. It is through the medium of trade that
national economies relate to each other, and it is the framework of rules
negotiated by trade specialists that govern the nature of that relationship.
Because of the potential impact of environmental regulation on international competitiveness, as well as the desire of environmental regulators
to influence behavior beyond national borders through trade measures,
there is now a pressing need for environmental regulators to learn from
trade negotiators and vice versa.
For trade negotiators, working with other subject specialists is nothing new. Fifty years ago, trade negotiations dealt largely with tariffs and
quotas (i.e., government policy measures applied at the border). Trade
negotiators, therefore, were usually drawn from among those people who
had some experience in dealing with these matters. As the boundaries of
trade negotiations have expanded, trade negotiators have of necessity
learned to deal with a much wider range of issues. Doing so required
* Senior Advisor, Trade Policy Studies, Department of External Affairs and International
Trade; Adjunct Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University
(Ottawa, Ontario).
** Senior Economic/Environment Analyst, Department of External Affairs and International
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the Government of Canada.
I The Cocoyoc Declaration was adopted at the Cocoyoc Symposium on Patternson Resources
Use, Environment, and Development Strategy, held in Cocoyoc, Mexico (October 1974).

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18:207 1992

that they learn to "share" their file. Over the past few years, they have
learned to work with industrial policy specialists, government procurement experts, competition lawyers, service industry regulators, product
health and safety inspectors and more. Each of these fields has its own
assumptions, goals and sensitivities. As a result, relations have not always been easy between trade negotiators and other issue specialists, but
both sides have adjusted, have made the necessary compromises and
have managed to serve the national interest as defined by the government
of the day.
Trade negotiations have now expanded to touch upon the domain of
environmental regulators, or put the other way, political pressure to address environmental issues is now affecting issues that may best be addressed through trade negotiations. As a result, it is now necessary for
trade negotiators and environmental regulators to learn to share this file
and work out common objectives. 2
The integration of environmental concerns into trade policy and
vice versa raises a variety of complex conceptual and practical concerns.
The analysis of these issues is still at an early stage of development, and
much work remains to be done to enlarge our understanding of what is
involved. Some early conclusions about the direction that work should
take, however, can already be reached. In this paper we explore why
these two disparate groups of specialists have come to share a file by
looking at developments in the international economy and in thinking
about the environment, the problems trade and environmental specialists
are likely to encounter and the kinds of compromises they may need to
make, with particular reference to the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA") negotiations.
COMPETING IDEOLOGIES

The trade/environment interface contains potential for conflict that
may run somewhat deeper than, for example, that between trade and
competition policies or that between trade and industrial policies. The
popular conception is that trade and environment specialists bring not
only different perspectives to the issues, but in many ways operate from
within seemingly incompatible ideologies.
To a trade specialist, trade policy serves the general objective of raising economic welfare. Each facet of the trade file - trade negotiations,
dispute settlement, trade relations and trade promotion - is based on
the premise that that activity will help bake a bigger pie from which
2 The need for this cooperation is now widely recognized. Both GATT and the OECD have
established working groups drawing on both trade and environmental specialists. See, e.g., GATT,
PUB. L/6896, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: FACTUAL NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT (1991) [hereinafter GATT, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT]; OECD, PUB. ENV/EC (91) 4, ENVIRONMENT AND
TRADE: MAJOR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1991); OECD, Pub. COM/ENV/rD (92) 5, SYNTHESIS
REPORT: THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRADE

(1992).

Hart-TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

everyone will eventually benefit. Reducing government-imposed barriers
to the free flow of goods and services is one of the time-tested ways of
achieving greater prosperity through trade. While the path to freer trade
may require detours such as quotas, voluntary restraint agreements and
countervailing duties, the goal remains trade as unfettered by government-imposed barriers as possible. Environmental regulators, on the
other hand, assume that the pie may already be too big and that activities
which promote economic growth are dangerous to the long-term ecological health of the planet. Their task is to find policies and programs that
will decrease pressure on a fragile biosphere and reverse such damage as
has already been done, even if that goal may at times require compromises. If such policies and programs result in barriers to trade, it is a
price worth paying. Antoine St. Pierre summarizes the potential for conflict between these competing values as follows:
...free-trade advocates contend that many environmental regulations
are thinly disguised non-tariff barriers to trade. At the opposite end of
the ideological spectrum, environmentalists lobby for environmental
measures regardless of cost to industries and consumers. They also
distrust the harmonization of policies brought about by trade agreements because it tends to reduce environmental standards to a lowest
common denominator and to limit the range of actions available to
governments in implementing environmental preservation policies. 3
From the start, therefore, there seems to exist a basic suspicion between the two groups of specialists which might hinder their capacity to
compromise and find common ground. Such suspicion is, of course, not
unique. Competition regulators, for example, find international rules
about dumping irrational and at odds with their efforts to promote competition. Industrial policy specialists, interested in promoting higher
levels of private sector research and development, are uncomfortable
with international rules aimed at curbing the ability of governments to
provide various incentives. Banking regulators worry that an open trade
regime will compromise their ability to maintain fiduciary standards.
Public discussion of the apparent conflict between environmental
goals and trade goals provides an excellent example of the extent to
which such discussion is often misinformed and even wrong. False assertions and questionable conclusions are often reflected and magnified by
the popular media, more because they are sensational than because they
are right. Sober and careful analysis is unlikely to gain similar widespread attention, because it is often the painstaking work of experts and
is not readily accessible to generalists.
As a result, there has developed a high degree of public conflict and
controversy around the trade/environment interface, largely due to inadequate discussions between those who passionately espouse environmen3 ANTOINE ST. PIERRE, CONFERENCE BOARD ON CANADA, REPORT No. 76-9-E, IMPACT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE

3 (1991).
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tal causes and those interested in promoting trade and related economic
issues. Debate about North American free trade illustrates the extent to
which the issues involved have become misunderstood and thus easy prey
for those interested in sterile confrontation and protectionist solutions.
The level of conflict apparent during that debate suggests the need both
for more research and for more informed public discussion.
Decisions about what to negotiate internationally and with whom
involve choices from among competing objectives. What will prove an
acceptable balance in one jurisdiction, however, may prove unacceptable
in another due to differing national values, endowments and priorities.
Thus, compromises are required not only within societies, but also between societies. The perceived conflict between various public policy
objectives, however, is rarely as stark as special interests would like the
public to believe. Nevertheless, good public policy requires that issue
specialists find common ground and determine the extent to which presumed conflicts are soundly based or proceed from prejudices and popular fallacies.
Such common ground is unlikely to be found by extremists in the
trade policy and environmental camps.' Little purpose will be served by
insisting that the patterns and volumes of trade and production must be
determined solely by the dictates of the market. Trade is not just a matter of economics; it is also a matter of politics. Trade takes place within a
framework of domestic and international rules set by governments responding to a range of competing interests and values, one of which is
the protection of the environment. It is, therefore, unrealistic to insist
that environmental objectives should not be allowed to compromise trade
and economic objectives. The reverse is equally valid: it is not reasonable to insist that environmental objectives take precedence over all other
societal goals. Again, public policy involves making choices. In effect,
however, there is little need to make choices between environmental and
economic goals. Public controversy notwithstanding, we believe that it is
possible in most cases to satisfy both sets of these seemingly incompatible
objectives or to find instruments that satisfy one goal while infficting
minimum damage on the other.
Much public discussion seems to be based on a series of questionable
assumptions, including that:
4 Notes Stewart Hudson of the National Wildlife Federation in the United States:

Much of the debate on trade and environment has centered on demonstrating the relative
merits of free trade or protectionism, or open or closed economies, in dealing with environmental problems. If these problems are discussed in the context of sustainable development, a more optimal use of collective brainpower would be spent in identifying the
emerging issues of trade and environment, and would be spent in identifying the emerging
issues of trade and environment, and raising questions that need to be resolved in order for
world trade to promote sustainable development.
See Stewart Hudson, Trade, Environment, and the Pursuit of SustainableDevelopment, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 59 (World Bank Discussion Paper 159, Patrick Low ed.,
1992).
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economic growth and environmental degradation are closely
linked;
" open markets lead to economic growth and may thus exacerbate
environmental degradation;
" open markets lead to pressures to liberalize (i.e., harmonize at a
lower level) existing or future regulations aimed at protecting the
biosphere;
" trade liberalization between industrialized and poorer countries
will encourage the development of pollution havens in the latter
countries as companies exploit laxer environmental regulations;
and
" more stringent environmental regulation in industrialized countries will reduce the competitiveness of established industries and
increase the economic welfare costs of trade liberalization.
Few of these assumptions survive serious analysis. Careful research
by economic and environmental specialists alike5 has demonstrated that:
" economic prosperity is one of the most important determinants
leading to a cleaner and more sustainable environment;
" promoting economic development in third world countries
through trade and investment is one of the most efficient ways to
raise environmental conditions on a global basis;
" trade-restricting measures are often the least efficient way of ensuring that prices reflect environmental costs and thus rarely
achieve environmental goals and may even retard them;
" achieving environmental goals by means of trade measures lends
itself too easily to protectionist abuse; and
" there is no fundamental conflict between environmental objectives
and the goals and provisions of the GATT-based trade relations
system, although there is room for clarification to remove any ambiguities and to strengthen the basis upon which the trade and
environmental files can be made more overtly complementary.
Finding an acceptable basis upon which environmental and trade
policy specialists can cooperate would thus seem to involve a number of
basic concepts; it must proceed from an agreed notion of sustainable development, and it must include agreed definitions of the role and limits of
trade policy and environmental protection in nurturing sustainable development. We examine each of these elements in turn.
"

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Until the beginning of the industrial revolution, the environmental
5 This work is very ably summarized in a series of papers presented at a World Bank Symposium edited by Patrick Low. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4.
Another good overview is provided by Peter A.G. van Bergijk, InternationalTrade and the Environmental Challenge," J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1991, at 105-115, which includes extensive bibliographic
references.
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impact of production and trade was relatively small and limited largely
to local effects. Over the past century, however, our use of the planet's
finite resources and renewables has grown exponentially, and so has the
impact of that use. There is broad agreement today that the result of this
intensifying exploitation of our resources is increasing pressure on the
environment, both locally and globally. As a result, one of the most fundamental conflicts between the trade and environmental files is the presumed conflict between economic growth and protection of the
environment. Is this conflict real or imagined?
The intuitive answer many would give is that this conflict is real.
Careful analysis, however, does not bear out this conclusion. To understand why, one must begin with an appropriate concept of the goal of
environmental protection - one that is consonant with public policy in a
democratic society. If the goal is to halt all activities that may in any
way alter the current state of the environment or return it to earlier conditions, then there may be no alternative to conflict. Such an approach to
environmental regulation, however, is neither reasonable nor necessary.
From time immemorial, man has altered his physical environment, either
consciously or unconsciously. The only constant has been continual adaptation. The operative question, therefore, is whether man has altered
his environment for better or for worse. More specifically, has the
human species, in changing its environment, added to or subtracted from
the overall well-being of the species? When viewed from a sufficiently
long and broad perspective, as the environment and circumstances have
changed, the general well-being of most of the species has improved.
It was Thomas Malthus who first suggested some two hundred years
ago that the planet's resources were finite and that if the global population continued to grow, there would eventually not be enough food to
feed everyone. Since then, the basic Malthusian thesis has been refined
and adapted to a wide variety of predictions about the capacity of the
planet to sustain life as we know it, all of them sharing his basic pessimism. Neither Malthus nor his spiritual descendants accept the Darwinian concept of adaptation or the potential impact of improvements in
technology. Malthus' prediction of mass starvation would have happened by now if it had not been for the constant improvement in agricultural techniques as well as transportation and distribution systems, all
fueled by economic growth.
A few examples should illustrate why some of the pessimism of environmental extremists is not well founded. When Malthus was writing,
the combination of coal fires and the particular climatic conditions in
southeastern England produced the infamous London smog. Its impact
on human, animal and plant life and health was clearly unacceptable.
The addition of industrial and car exhaust fumes in the twentieth century
made conditions intolerable. Today, as a result of the introduction of
newer technologies and stricter regulation, made possible because the inhabitants found conditions intolerable and were prepared to pay for im-
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provements through higher prices, taxes and regulatory burdens, London
smog has become an historical phenomenon. It would not have disappeared, however, if there had not been economic incentives to discover
the necessary technologies and economic growth to pay for their
application.
Similarly, the Cayuga River and Lake Erie were for years synonymous with environmental rape. While neither has yet been returned to
an acceptable level, it is now safe to light a match when crossing the
Cayuga, and it will not be long before Lake Erie is again safe for
swimming.
What these examples have in common is that the human species,
having first affected the environment negatively, has since adapted and
has learned to affect it positively. The key to both changes in direction
came about because markets were allowed to work. At the beginning of
the process, the value of exploiting the environment negatively was less
than the negative effects, leading to degradation. Once these negative
effects became clear and unacceptable, appropriate steps to adapt were
taken, leading to an improvement. 6 As Marian Radetzki concluded at a
recent World Bank symposium:
There simply is no evidence of general environmental deterioration in
consequence of continued economic growth. Empirical observation
suggests, if anything, the obverse relationship to be closer to the truth:
that the quality of the environment improves as the density of the
economy increases.7
Therefore, in developing an acceptable approach to define how best
to achieve a cooperative trade and environment interface, the first element involves agreeing on an appropriate definition of what constitutes
sustainable development. The definition set out by the Brnndtland Commission provides a good starting point as a working hypothesis for this
paper:
Sustainable development is best understood as a process of change in
which the use of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological developments, and institutional change all en-8
hance the potential to meet human needs both today and tomorrow.
Sustainable development does not mean that there will be no conflicts or adjustments, particularly at the micro level. The decision to protect the rare spotted owl in the U.S. Northwest, for example, has
profound implications for the U.S. and Canadian lumber industries and
6 Economists explain this phenomenon in terms of an inverted U curve. Conflict between
North and South in the preparations for the U.N. Conference on the Environment and Development, for example, reflect differences of view on where countries see themselves on this U curve.
7 Marian Radetzki, Economic Growth andEnvironment, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 127.
8 WORLD COMMISSION ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE

46 (1987).
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downstream industries dependent on that lumber. The capture of
sulphur from the stacks of smelters and coal-fired generating stations has
changed the outlook for sulphur mining. At the same time, higher environmental standards may also lead to new opportunities. Greater environmental awareness has already proven a spur to welcoming new
technologies and processes. 9 Many Canadian and U.S. companies have
been among those in the forefront of developing new products and
processes that respect the fragile interaction between man and nature.
TRADE AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY

While there does not appear to be much evidence to support the
proposition that economic growth leads to long-term deterioration of the
environment, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that trade leads
to economic growth. Indeed, the positive relationship between trade and
economic growth is one of the oldest and most established concepts in
economic theory.
Canada and the United States are prosperous countries, in part, because of their historically strong trade performance. Success in buying
and selling on world markets has made each country a major contributor
to and beneficiary of the global economy. Since World War II, the progressive liberalization of markets has encouraged the two economies to
adjust and become more integrated into the world economy. This has
allowed producers in both countries to specialize in what they do best
and to let consumers buy their other requirements more cheaply from
abroad. As a result, incomes in both countries have grown steadily.
Most of us are prepared to accept that exports are an important
contributor to our economic well-being. We are less familiar with the
importance of imports in giving us the high standard of living we all take
for granted. We import in order to obtain more final intermediate products at lower prices than we would be able to produce such products for
ourselves. As a result, we are able to devote to that which we do best the
capital, technology and people which would otherwise be used to produce the goods and services we now import. Imports help to keep firms
competitive and provide both firms and individuals with the latest products and technologies, including those aimed at improving the environment. Our ability to buy a wide range of competitively priced foreign
products with the proceeds of our exports has left us with more money to
do other things - money to serve both personal and national needs, including protection of the environment.
Trade policies that promote the most efficient use of scarce resources
9 See MICHAEL PORTER, BUSINESS COUNCIL ON NATIONAL ISSUES, CANADA AT THE CROSS-

ROADS: THE REALITY OF A NEW COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 92-95 (1991) (pointing out that the
more stringent regulatory requirements, including tougher environmental standards, faced by Scandinavian forest products companies was a key ingredient in making them more innovative and more
competitive than their Canadian counterparts).
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on an international basis will stimulate economic growth on a global basis. Trade policies that restrict access to markets and encourage the uneconomic exploitation of resources will retard growth. From an
environmental perspective, the most appropriate use of resources would
occur if prices were able to reflect the true costs of their production to the
environment. That is more likely to happen if markets are allowed to
work, than if they are not. The world of agricultural trade offers a good
example of market failure as a result of inappropriate trade and economic
policies and the resultant pressures on the environment. Production subsidies and closed borders have resulted in highly intensive land exploitation in Western Europe at a level that is not compatible with the longterm sustainability of that land. If markets were allowed to work, European agriculture would become less intensive and more sustainable in the
long term, and European consumers would benefit from the lower costs
of imported food products.
The example of agriculture suggests that trade policy decisions do
not always make economic sense. Continuing restrictions affecting world
trade in textiles and clothing offer a further example of pragmatic and
necessary compromises between economic and other objectives. These
examples, however, should not be taken as failures of the world trading
system. Rather, they indicate the extent to which the international trade
rules have managed to contain protectionist zeal and provide a framework within which to address problems arising in sensitive areas, such as
agriculture and textiles, in an orderly manner.
The second element in defining an appropriate trade and environment interface, therefore, involves acceptance of the fact that maintaining an open trade regime is key to maintaining sustainable economic
development. Compromises may at times be necessary between economic and other objectives, including environmental objectives, but such
compromises should be addressed within the framework of existing rules
and should not undermine the basic values of an open trading system.
ENVIRONMENT POLICIES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

In the last few decades, awareness of the need to protect the fragile
biosphere has approached the top of the public policy agenda. The depletion of the ozone layer, global warming, waste disposal problems and
the threatened extinction of plant and animal species are just a few examples of the issues that have made protecting the environment an urgent
global priority. No responsible politician today would any longer deny
the importance of this issue. Business leaders have become acutely aware
of the need to be sensitive to environmental concerns. The issue is no
longer whether, but how. A major challenge, therefore, is to find an acceptable balance between environmental and economic goals.
As we noted earlier, the aim of environmental policy is to ensure
that the planet remains a viable and rewarding place for the human spe-
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cies. It follows that not all activity that has a negative impact on the
environment is necessarily bad, nor should environmental concerns always take precedence over other societal goals. For example, modern
society devours a considerable amount of energy on a daily basis. Conservation may reduce, but will not eliminate, the appetite for vast quantities of energy. Each of the various sources poses environmental risks:
burning coal pollutes the atmosphere; hydro-electric power may require
the damming of rivers and the destruction of fragile eco-systems; nuclear
power may lead to devastating accidents and requires the disposal of
highly hazardous wastes; and the burning of fossil fuels contributes to
global warming. Newer, less hazardous forms of energy remain as yet
impractical on any large scale. Living without energy is not an acceptable solution. The challenge, therefore, is to find the best combination of
imperfect instruments that will least contribute to environmental
problems and at the same time not undermine maintenance of an open
trading system. The World Bank's Patrick Low concludes:
...
the simple idea that environmental standards are not absolutes
with infinite values turns out to be very powerful. It implies greater
scope for policy flexibility. It undermines some of the less reasoned
populist positions on the environment, in particular on trade and the
environment, and it weakens the position of protectionists that seek to
conceal their demands for trade restrictions in environmental
arguments. 10
In keeping with the goal of ensuring that economic development
sustains the capacity of the globe to meet current and future human
needs, measures aimed at protecting the environment should be sufficient
to meet the objectives they are meant to achieve, but should not be more
than sufficient. Determining sufficiency is a matter both of establishing a
scientific basis for the measure and also of investigating least cost alternatives (i.e., costs that reflect appropriate tradeoffs between environmental
and other societal goals).
The third element in developing an appropriate approach to the
trade/environment interface thus involves ensuring that environmental
policies meet the standard of sufficiency (i.e., that they are a necessary
and legitimate response to the problem and are proportional to the goals
being sought). Given differences in environmental preferences, as well as
financial and technological capabilities in different countries, a great deal
of analysis and consultation will be required on a case-by-case basis to
develop a consensus as to what constitutes sufficiency. Despite differences of view as to, for example, risk assessment, suitability and appropriate bench-marks involved in environmental measures, the sufficiency
standard should provide a rational basis for dialogue as well as a stan10 Patrick Low & Raed Safadi, Trade Policy and Pollution 8-9, original manuscript presented
at the World Bank Symposium on International Trade and the Environment (November 21-22,
1991) (unpublished, on file with the author).
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dard upon which to make informed public choices and resolve intergovernmental conflict.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TRADE

Environmental problems are now understood to involve a wide
range of issues. Efforts to address these can be divided into two broad
categories: efforts to protect the physical environment, whether water,
air or land; and efforts to conserve resources, whether renewable or not,
including the protection of endangered or threatened plant and animal
species. In each case, the specific problems addressed can be classified as
either local, regional (including transboundary) or global. The nature of
the problem dictates the solution and the range of interests involved. For
example, whether a particular plot of land should be used as a park, as a
housing development or as a factory site will in most instances engage
only local interests. If that plot of land happens to be on the border
between two states, and the proposed factory will involve a nuclear
power facility, the issue may well engage interests on both sides of the
border. If the proposed land use involves a factory that will produce
ozone-depleting gases, global interests are engaged.
It is the wide range of problems and solutions and the increasing
realization that more than local issues and interests must be met that has
made the need to address the environmental/trade interface urgent. For
our purposes, however, we need only concern ourselves with those environmental policies and measures that either involve trade policy measures or implicate trade flows.
Generally speaking, trade and environmental policies can be understood to intersect along two axes; meeting environmental goals may require policies that must be enforced either directly or indirectly by trade
measures, and/or environmental measures may affect the international
competitiveness of certain producers. Conflict may thus arise between
environmental and trade objectives as a result of:
* the use of trade instruments to enforce compliance with national
regulations, such as restrictions on the imports of products that
do not meet domestic standards;
" the use of trade measures to enforce international environmental
agreements, such as sanctions, against the products of non-complying countries; and
* compliance costs borne by producers in one jurisdiction but not in
another.
Controversy in the application of these measures often results from
national differences in assessing the need for environmental protection
and from the choice of instruments used as remedies. While international harmonization would eliminate some of the conflict, it is neither
reasonable nor necessary to insist on international harmonization in
many instances. There should be room to allow for differences in ecolog-
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ical conditions, comparative advantage, social preferences and political
choices among national jurisdictions. Nevertheless, there may be a need
for the international community to cooperate in developing common
standards to reduce conflict and provide an improved basis for resolving
disputes. International agreements facilitate national decision-making by
providing a framework of rules within which to address the demands of
domestic special interests. Trade agreements and trade policy measures,
however, may not necessarily be the best instruments for setting environmental standards, particularly where the trade dimension is at best marginal or incidental.
Trade is rarely the cause of environmental degradation, although
there are circumstances where it may draw attention to an existing environmental problem. Rather, the root cause of environmental degradation lies in the failure of markets to fully reflect environmental costs,
often due to inadequate or inappropriate government policies or consumer information. Consequently, the most effective solution lies in implementing measures that will allow markets to reflect these costs more
accurately and thus influence the behavior of producers and consumers
away from environmentally hostile decisions.
While trade itself is rarely the cause of an environmental problem,
the products traded internationally or the processes by which they are
produced may embody an environmental problem. Therefore, once a
government decides to address an environmental issue that may be embodied in a tradable good or service, it must first determine whether the
solution lies in the product itself or in the process by which it is produced. In deciding what approach works best, a range of instruments
may be used. The choice of appropriate instruments - regulations,
taxes, standards, subsidies or trade restrictions - is thus not only an
environmental issue, but also an issue affecting industrial policy, fiscal
policy or trade policy. The final decision may ultimately require a choice
involving tradeoffs between competing objectives.
TRADE MEASURES TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH
DOMESTIC STANDARDS

All countries have in a place a range of measures affecting the production, distribution and sale of domestic output as well as the necessary
instruments to ensure that imported products do not undermine these
measures. For example, a Canadian law banning the production and sale
of a particular toxic product will also include a ban on the importation of
that product. Similarly, the imposition of a domestic commodity tax at
the production stage will also involve a similar tax on importation. Labeling requirements must be met by both domestic and imported products. Thus, there is nothing unusual in a country's insisting that its
environmental laws and regulations apply equally to domestic and imported products and in using trade measures to enforce such a policy.
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Problems may be encountered, however, if such measures differentiate between domestic and imported products (i.e., if the burden of compliance is heavier on imported than on domestic products). While
international trade law will tolerate some differentiation, it must be
shown that such differentiation is necessary to meet the objectives of the
policy and does not amount to a disguised restriction on trade. As we
shall see below, many of the problems that have been experienced in the
environment/trade interface in the past few years can be traced to the
failure of governments to justify the necessity for differentiating between
domestic and imported products.
A second problem may arise if the measure regulates the process by
which a product is produced, rather than the product itself. If the domestic and imported products are indistinguishable, but the processes by
which they have been produced are different, the temptation to insist that
imported products must meet the same process standards will be very
high. Producers that do not meet the necessary process standards, and
their respective governments, may well complain that the trade measure
being used to enforce the process standard is discriminatory. In effect,
extending process standards to imported products amounts to one state's
extraterritorial extension of its own laws. The result is likely to be conflict, particularly if there is not broad international consensus on the
objectives being pursued by means of the process standard. Recent cases
such as the U.S.-EC dispute about beef hormones, the U.S.-Mexico dispute about yellowfin tuna and Canada-EC differences on clear-cut versus
selective-cut forestry management practices illustrate the difficulties that
can be encountered when one country adopts a different process standard
than another.
A third problem may be encountered if one country is determined to
conserve a particular natural resource and takes steps at its border to
enforce such a policy either through import or export measures that have
the effect of differentiating between domestic and foreign producers.
Both Canada and the United States, for example, restrict the export of
logs. Several Canadian provinces have further processing requirements
for minerals extracted in that province. Such measures may serve important environmental objectives, but may also serve protectionist ends.
As we shall see below, while there are problems that may be encountered in the application of border measures to enforce domestic environmental laws and regulations, the international trade regime has to date
proved adequate to the task of insisting that such measures meet certain
basic standards aimed at avoiding intergovernmental conflict. However,
there remains room for improvement by, for example, developing clearer
definitions and procedures attuned to new circumstances.
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TRADE MEASURES TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

The use of trade sanctions to enforce internationally agreed upon
environmental standards has a mixed history regarding their effectiveness
and conformity with trade rules. As with any international sanctions,
their effectiveness is directly related to the degree of international agreement and commitment they enjoy. Sanctions applied by only a few states
to influence the behavior of many states are unlikely to be successful.
Sanctions applied by many states to influence the behavior of a few states
are much more likely to succeed.
Such sanctions are not automatically at odds with international
trade rules. The experience in enforcing the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES") offers
a positive example of the use of trade measures to enforce environmental
objectives. Depletion in the numbers of an endangered species such as
the African elephant may be directly linked to demand for and trade in
ivory. In such an event, the solution lies to a large extent in eliminating
or strictly controlling that trade through trade restrictions. There has
not been much international conflict about either the goal or the means
in such an obvious trade-linked example. The Convention is a well-established instrument, and the need to use trade restrictions along these
lines is well provided for in international trade law." Similarly, since
1906, many countries have enforced an international ban on trade in
matches made with white phosphorus as a result of an international
agreement recognizing the dangers in the manufacturing process
involved.12
Conflict may arise, however, when there is insufficient international
consensus on either the environmental objectives being sought or the
need for trade restrictions to ensure compliance. Trade restrictions
aimed not only at enforcing compliance by signatories, but also at gaining broader participation, may be challenged by non-participants on
grounds of discrimination. The Montreal Protocol on Substances which
Deplete the Ozone Layer, for example, imposes more onerous trade restrictions on non-signatories than on signatories in an effort to expand
participation and prevent the relocation or expansion of production of
the banned substances in non-signatories nations. Its trade provisions
may well be open to challenge by non-signatories.
Even more difficult is the use of trade sanctions by one state or a few
in order to influence the environmental policies of other states.
Whatever the merits of the environmental objective being sought, the
11 A good description of CITES from a trade policy perspective is provided in GATT, TRADE

supra note 2.
Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, J. WORLD
TRADE L., Oct. 1991, provides a number of historical examples of successful environment-based
trade restrictions.
AND ENVIRONMENT,
12
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unilateral use of sanctions by a powerful country or by a group of countries sets a potentially dangerous precedent for the validity of international rule making and enforcement. It undermines the important
principle that trade measures should not be used to force acceptance of
other countries' policies and values except under extreme circumstances,
and then only when sanctioned by an international body such as the
U.N. Security Council.
The effective use of trade sanctions to enforce compliance with internationally agreed upon environmental standards thus requires at least
three elements: wide acceptance of the standard being enforced, broad
consensus on the most appropriate and effective instrument needed to
gain compliance, and broad agreement that a departure from the principle of non-discrimination is necessary and will be effective. If these conditions are met, there is unlikely to be conflict with trade rules. If
necessary, the GATT's waiver provisions could be successfully invoked.
It is only when these conditions are not met that there is likely to be
conflict, and the trading rules in such circumstances stand as an important barrier to arbitrary and discriminatory behavior by a minority of
states or a powerful state acting unilaterally.
TRADE MEASURES TO LEVEL THE ENVIRONMENTAL PLAYING FIELD

One of the most frequently raised concerns is that environmental
protection policies undermine the competitiveness of firms because of
high compliance costs. Arguments have been advanced that unless there
is broad international consensus on particular goals and instruments,
governments should be allowed to take steps to "level the playing field"
by taking appropriate action in the field of trade, usually by means of
countervailing or offsetting duties of one kind or another.
Before considering whether trade policy should be used to level
playing fields, we should consider the extent to which environmental regulations undermine competitiveness. Recent analytical and empirical
work suggests that the aggregate additional costs of meeting environmental requirements in the United States add less than one percent to the
cost of doing business. 13 Aggregate costs, of course, reflect wide variation, and in highly competitive industries, additional costs of even one
percent can make the difference between profit and loss. The relative
cost of compliance with existing pollution requirements, however, appears to be modest and well within the capacity of most industries to
absorb. At the same time, as pointed out by Michael Porter in his study
of the Canadian economy, compliance with tough pollution standards
13 Patrick Low indicates that for the United States, the weighted average cost to output of
pollution abatement and control equipment was 0.54 percent, with the highest ratio, for the cement
industry, being just over three percent. See Patrick Lowe, Trade Measuresand EnvironmentalQuality: ImplicationsforMexico's Exports, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 4, at 107.
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can also prove a powerful incentive14to innovation and an important step
toward improving competitiveness.
Related to concern about differential compliance costs is the fear
that countries will use lower standards as an investment incentive and
thus become pollution havens. Again, the evidence to support this fear is
not very robust. While the assimilative capacities of some countries particularly developing countries - to absorb or tolerate higher levels,
for example, of atmospheric pollution may attract some dirty industries
to relocate, the cost of relocating must be taken into account along with
labor costs, proximity to either suppliers or customers, the availability of
low-cost energy supplies, fiscal policy and other factors that influence
such decisions. Additionally, experience suggests that technological improvements to meet tougher environmental standards usually go hand in
hand with broader technological improvements. New investments in, for
example, developing countries to replace investments in traditional
"dirty" industries of already industrialized countries are likely to involve
use of the latest technologies and thus lead to a net reduction in global
pollution levels.' 5
The whole question, however, needs to be kept in perspective.
Countries trade in order to exploit the comparative advantage they derive from differing factor endowments, such as available resources, the
quality and price of labor, the policy environment, the costs of inputs and
proximity to markets. The international trading rules seek to ensure that
comparative advantage can work and lead to a more efficient allocation
of scarce resources on a global basis. Efforts to put in place trade barriers aimed at leveling the playing
field in effect defeat the whole basis
16
upon which trade takes place.
Pressures to level the playing field, of course, are not new. In the
first years of this century, U.S. economists were much preoccupied with
developing arguments for and against the so-called scientific tariff. The
idea was that the U.S. tariff on individual products should be set at a
level high enough to offset the cost advantages enjoyed by foreign producers, but no higher. 7 The devilishly clever variable levy used by the EC
to protect its agricultural producers works much the same way. The result is very little trade. While the whole concept is economic nonsense,
more sophisticated versions keep cropping up. Current demands that
14 PORTER, supra note 9.

15 See, e.g., Nancy Birdsall & David Wheeler, Trade Policy and IndustrialPollution in Latin
America: Where are the Pollution Havens?, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT,

supra note 4, at 159; Patrick Low & Alexander Yeats, Do "Dirty" IndustriesMigrate?, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 89; Piritta Sorsa, GATT and Environment: Basic Issues and Some Developing Country Concerns, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 4, at 325.
16 See JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 208-210 (1991).
17 See JACOB VINER, The Tariff Question and the

109 (1951).
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producers facing higher environmental compliance costs in one country
should be allowed to seek countervailing duties to offset these costs on
imported products fall into the same category."8 The formidable methodological difficulties of measuring comparative costs of pollution compliance in differing jurisdictions involve an intolerable unilateral
intrusion into the policies of one country by another. The solution lies in
negotiating international rules and standards that respect both the need
to promote environmental protection and the desirability of maintaining
an open trading system.
POLICY DIVERGENCE AND HARMONIZATION

To some, of course, the answer lies in a much greater degree of international harmonization of product and process standards at sufficiently high levels, so that environmental objectives would not be
compromised by agreement around the lowest common denominator.
While there has been considerable positive experience over the last ten
years in reaching internationally agreed upon basic standards, it is
neither necessary nor desirable to insist on such harmonization in all
cases. 19 Indeed, much of the effort in international trade negotiations has
been predicated on the desire to reduce the trade-distorting effect of differing regulatory approaches rather than on harmonization per se.
There is broad international acceptance today that different countries may rationally choose different levels of, for example, environmental
protection depending on such factors as unique local conditions and different policy priorities. The impact of car exhaust fumes on the environment of Mexico City is markedly differently from their impact on the
environment of Regina, Saskatchewan. Additionally, there are circumstances in which governments are prepared to agree on ways and means
to accept each others' standards where the detail may be different, but
the effect the same. Efforts within the EC are probably the most advanced, and even within this highly integrated multi-national market,
there is broad acceptance that there are legitimate reasons for imposing
different standards.
Environmentalists worry that any efforts to achieve harmonization
or acceptance of equivalence will lead to acceptance of the lowest common denominator. Experience to date suggests that such fears are unwarranted. International discussions have usually accepted the principle
that member states to any international standard are free to impose
18 The fact that countervailing duties are assessed for a variety of other equally dubious reasons, almost exclusively by the United States exercising its economic muscle, in no way justifies the
use of this draconian measure for environmental reasons. The whole concept that trade must be
"fair", a notion particularly popular among Washington lawyers, lobbyists and legislators, has no
intellectual foundation. A devastating survey of what is wrong with the fair trade concept is pro-

vided in

JAMES BOVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD

(1991).

19 For example, in discussions at the World Health Organization ("WHO"), the Food and
Agriculture Organization ("FAO") and the International Standards Organization ("ISO").
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higher standards than the international norm, sometimes adding the proviso that such higher standards should not constitute a disguised or arbitrary restriction on trade. Additionally, pressures from business interests
to accept lower standards are now more than offset by the demands of
environmental groups, often making such business pressures less
credible.
Harmonization of standards is a time-consuming and resource-intensive activity and is most likely to be achieved where there is a degree
of consensus on the objectives to be achieved. Even then, the technical
requirements may be formidable, particularly where there is already considerable experience with differing standards in different jurisdictions.20
Little progress toward greater uniformity in environmental standards is likely to be achieved in the absence of international cooperative
efforts. At the same time, resorting to unilateral trade measures aimed at
enforcing unique environmental standards will likely do little more than
undermine healthy international competition and harm global economic
prosperity. Patrick Low notes:
Environmental diversity and differences in assimilation capacity become part of what countries seek to take advantage of by specializing
through trade, rather than what they seek to eradicate through trade
restrictions 2and
fatuous harmonization that is destructive of
1
competition.

Much standards-setting activity, of course, falls outside the scope of
governments and involves cooperative efforts through industry-sponsored organizations and other private sector links such as licensing arrangements. The driving force behind this activity is the recognition that
markets are global and that a proliferation of standards undermines
competitiveness.
The desire for greater uniformity should be seen as part of the response by governments and industry toward the globalization of production and markets. On the macro-economic side, there is growing
convergence, with all governments pursuing policies aimed at ensuing
price stability. On the micro-economic side, there is both convergence
and rivalry, with governments using a range of policy measures both to
protect existing investments and attract new investment. While harmonization per se is not necessarily virtuous, environmental policy rivalry
either to attract or protect investment - would seem an inappropriate
and potentially destructive approach, similar to the harmful use of subsi20 The slow progress in the technical discussions on phyto-sanitary regulations mandated by
the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement ("FTA") provide a valuable object lesson in this
regard. Article 708 of the FTA provides for an ambitious work program aimed at reducing to the
maximum extent possible barriers to trade resulting from differing health and phyto-sanitary regulations. Canada and the United States, despite enjoying highly integrated markets and very similar
philosophies about health protection, have found it very difficult to accept each other's standards or

to reach agreement on common or harmonized standards.
21 Low & Safadi, supra note 10, at 8-9.
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dies to attract investment. From this perspective, convergence in the use

of environmental policy instruments is an important international
objective.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND THE

GATT

Over the past few years, an active international jurisprudence on the
intersection of trade and environmental policy has developed. These
cases have involved:
* a Canadian challenge of a U.S. embargo on imports of Canadian
tuna, justified as consistent with the requirements of Article
to the conservation of an exhaustible natural
XX(g) relating
22
resource;
" a U.S. challenge first of Canadian export controls on salmon and
herring and subsequently of landing requirements, both justified
on the grounds that23 they were required to back up resource management practices;
" a Canadian challenge of U.S. controls on the imports of lobsters
below a minimum size, justified on the grounds that24 the trade
measure was part of a resource management scheme;
* a challenge by the United States of a Thai ban on the importation
of cigarettes;2 5 and
" a Mexican challenge of U.S. restrictions on imports of yellowfin
tuna, justified on the grounds that the measure was necessary to
reduce the slaughter of dolphins as a result of the fishing methods
used by Mexican and other non-U.S. fishermen.26
22 29 GATr, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 91ff (1981-82). The panel
ruled that the measure had discriminated against Canada and could not be justified under article
XX(g), because there was insufficient evidence that the United States had taken steps to conserve
tuna either through domestic production or consumption measures.
23 The GATT panel ruled that Canada's export prohibition "could not be deemed to be primarily aimed at the conservation of salmon and herring stocks and rendering effective the restrictions on the harvesting of these fish... [and] were not justified by Article XX(g)." 35 GATT, BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 98ff (1987-88). The FTA panel ruled that the landing
requirement was similarly inconsistent because it also was not aimed primarily at conservation. The
landing requirement could be made consistent if a certain percentage was made available for export
at a level that would still allow the remaining catch to be landed and counted as part of a conservation management scheme. Final Report of the Panel Constituted Under Chapter 18 of the CanadaUnited States FrA, In the Matter of Canada'sLanding Requirementfor Pacific Coast Salmon and
Herring (Oct. 16, 1989) [hereinafter Final Report of Oct. 16, 1989].
24 Final Report of the Panel Constituted Under Chapter 18 of the Canada-United States FTA,
In the Matter of United States Minimum Size Requirement for Atlantic Coast Lobster (May 25,
1990). The panel ruled that the United States requirement was consistent with its GATT obligations
because it applied equally to both imports and domestic production.
25 37 GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 200ff (1989-90). The panel
ruled that the import ban on cigarettes was inconsistent with article XX(b) because other means
were available to Thailand to control the quantity and quality of cigarettes consumed consistent with
its health objectives without discriminating against imported products.

ECO[hereinaf-

26 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL

NOMICS,

NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 143 (1992)
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Environmental critics of the GATT-based trade rules have suggested that these and other cases indicate that trading rules are insensitive to modem concerns about the environment and need to be
overhauled in order to more clearly establish the precedence of environmental goals over trade goals. Our reading of this jurisprudence, however, is somewhat different. In our view, these cases suggest the ease
with which environmental concerns can be subverted to pursue less noble
objectives. The problem, therefore, may not lie in the rules, but in their
interpretation or abuse. Steve Charnovitz notes:
If the "greening" of the GATT means that the Contracting Parties
should respect environmental objectives in administering Article XX,
then greening is a good idea. But if greening means that the Contracting Parties should subordinate economic goals to ecological imperatives, then greening is a bad idea - for the environment and for the
GATT. It is a bad idea for the environment because the GATT does
not have the scientific expertise to judge what ecological measures are
appropriate. It is a bad idea for the GATT because environmental
policy would be too divisive for GATT's current decision-making
structure.27
While not perfect, the GATT rules, first negotiated in 1947, provide
a very solid foundation upon which to develop more detailed and more
modem rules. Their genius lies in the fact that they start with an enunciation of some very basic principles which can be summarized as follows:
the trade regimes of members states must be non-discriminatory, transparent and appropriate to the agreed upon goal of developing an open,
liberal international trading system. Should any conflict arise among
member states in the application of these principles, the GATT provides
more detailed rules spelling out more specific obligations as well as procedures for the resolution of disputes consonant with these principles.
At least seven GATT provisions can be invoked to address traderelated environmental issues. The first is that the trade measures used by
member states must be non-discriminatory. Any trade measure must apply equally to all member states (the most-favored-nation requirement of
Article I) and must not discriminate between goods of national origin
and imported goods, except for those GATT-sanctioned measures largely tariffs - applied at the border (the national treatment requirement of Article III). The requirements of Article III are spelled out in
much greater detail regarding the use of product standards, including the
ter HUFBAUER & SCHoTr]. The panel report rejected the U.S. claim that its measure was consistent
with its GATT requirements, ruling that it could not extend a process requirement extraterritorial to
products indistinguishable from those produced by domestic producers. In effect, it ruled that the
GATT applies to like products, not processes.
27 Charnovitz, supra note 12, at 55. This article provides a detailed and convincing discussion
of GATT law and environmental protection. Typical of negative environmental assessments of the
GATT is Steven Shrybman, International Trade and the Environment: An Environmental Assessment of Present GATT Negotiations, THE ECOLOGIST, Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 30-34.
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requirement that such regulations may not be used as a disguised restriction on trade and must serve a legitimate domestic objective. The GATT
Technical Barriers Code does not involve the establishment of standards,
but it encourages international harmonization. Current Uruguay Round
negotiations, however, involve improvements in the Code that may include more robust provisions leading to greater harmonization.
Second, GATT measures must be applied transparently (Article X).
Both domestic producers and international traders must have equal and
open access to those laws, regulations and procedures that affect their
ability to transact business in any market. The frequently voiced complaint by environmentalists that the trade regime discourages the use of
information about the environmental impact of various products misreads the GATT. The GATT places a very high premium on information, and enjoins its members from imposing differential regulations that
discriminate between domestic and imported products.
Third, GATT contracting parties ("CPs") may not use quantitative
restrictions ("QRs") except in clearly delineated circumstances (Article
XI). When quantitative restrictions are used, they must not discriminate
among foreign suppliers (Article XIII). The strong bias against QRs reflects GATT philosophy that such measures are likely to be more restrictive, less transparent and more discriminatory than measures that have a
direct price effect, such as tariffs. This GATT bias makes sense in an
environmental context. For example, the GATT allows a country to impose a tax on imported products to reflect its desire to let the final price
more closely reflect environmental costs, so long as that tax is also applied to domestically produced goods. The GATT does not want CPs to
use QRs to achieve such objectives.
Fourth, CPs may use subsidies to achieve various domestic objectives, including environmental goals, but may not use export subsidies
except for primary products (Article XVI). Products that benefit from
subsidies may be countervailed - a special tariff to offset the price effect
of the subsidy - if imports of the subsidized product can be shown to
cause material injury to domestic producers (Article VI). The rules relating to subsidies are amplified in the much more detailed subsidies code
negotiated during the Tokyo Round negotiations. A new, much improved code may emerge from the current Uruguay Round multilateral
trade negotiations.
Fifth, should there be conflict between any GATT article and the
desire of any CP to protect the environment - to protect animal, plant
or human life or health; to conserve exhaustible resources; or to take
action to ensure compliance with a domestic regulatory requirement not
otherwise inconsistent with the General Agreement - Article XX allows
members states to implement the environmental protection measure so
long as the measure does not constitute a disguised restriction of trade
and does not unjustifiably or arbitrarily discriminate among member
states.
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Sixth, in the event that none of the provisions outlined above is sufficient to justify a particular course of action, the waiver provisions (Article XXV:5) allow the CPs, by two-thirds vote constituting at least half of
all CPs, to waive any obligation contained in the agreement. The waiver
route provides GATT members with the opportunity to pass collective
judgment on a particular set of circumstances and avoids the need for
amendment to the text. The discriminatory aspects of the sanctions enjoined by the Montreal Protocol, for example, could be regularized by a
waiver should the necessary number of countries agree.
Finally, in order to prevent abuse of these various provisions, but
particularly Article XX, the GATT's dispute settlement provisions (Articles XXII and XXIII) provide the right to challenge the policies and
practices of other CPs on the ground that they "nullify or impair" benefits that could reasonably be anticipated as a result of the provisions of
the Agreement.
In addition to the plain language of the text, GATT law involves the
interpretations placed on these rules by various GATT decisions and
panel rulings. For example, the requirements of Article XX have been
interpreted to include the test that any measure justified under that Article must, in addition to not being a disguised restriction on trade, also be
necessary to meet the stated goal and involve the least restrictive
alternative.28
Over the years, the GATT has proven to be a dynamic instrument
capable of adapting to a range of changing requirements and circumstances as a result of periodic negotiations, decisions, panel rulings and
acceptance of regional and other arrangements imposing more stringent
requirements. The need to strengthen and modernize the GATT-based
trading system may be particularly acute today as a result of the explosion in international commerce and the changing nature of international
business, but the basic principles remain sound. The current Uruguay
Round marks the latest opportunity to modernize and improve the
GATT in response to these changing circumstances. Better rules to address environmental concerns are included on the agenda (e.g., in the
subsidies code).
Despite our conclusion that recent cases do not indicate a pressing
need to change the rules, we see a broader utility in considering whether
the existing trade rules can be adapted to accommodate environmental
concerns. Efforts to use trade measures to achieve environmental goals
are likely to continue to increase. Consequently, it makes sense to effect
such changes as can be made in order to ensure that environmental con28 This was the conclusion reached by the panel appointed under the terms of chapter 18 of the
FTA to adjudicate the Canada-U.S. dispute about landing requirements for salmon and herring in
the West Coast fishery. See Final Report of Oct. 16, 1989, supra note 23. While not a GATT panel,
its findings interpreted GATT law as applied between Canada and the United States and thus forms
part of the interpretations and rulings that will guide the policies of member states as well as any
GATT panel constituted to adjudicate any similar issue.
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cerns can be addressed without destroying the carefully developed but
fragile consensus favoring an open global economy. Additionally, environment-driven improvements in the trade rules must be considered in
the broader context of remaking the trading system to address the
problems generated by today's international economy.
THE ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

Trade agreements are fundamentally about regulating government
behavior. They set out rules about what governments can do to regulate
and influence the flow of goods, services, investment, technology and labor across national frontiers. The success of earlier negotiations in reduction barriers has led to a tremendous growth in world trade and in
global economic integration. That increased integration has identified
new areas of friction and conflict. As a result, the focus of trade negotiations is changing from measures applied at the border - tariffs and quotas
to measures and policies used by governments to regulate and influence behavior in the domestic market. Efforts to negotiate rules about
trade and the environment, therefore, are part of a larger effort to develop international standards and consensus on a wide range of issues
traditionally considered to be domestic in character, such as competition
policy, social policy and labor policy. These raise very difficult issues,
not the least of which is the extent to which governments are prepared to
raise the level of international agreement and accept new inroads into
domestic economic decision-making.2 9
This evolving agenda represents a fundamental shift in focus and
will only succeed if approached carefully and incrementally. It took
years to develop the current rules about border measures. It is unrealistic to expect that the necessary intellectual capital and international consensus can be developed in a few short years to address an even more
complex set of issues. The major challenge today, therefore, is not
whether we should negotiate some of these difficult issues, but how. A
fundamental consideration in determining how to begin to address these
issues is the requirement that governments must be careful not to undermine the basic principles that underpin the global trading system.
The GATT-based system provides a framework of rules, a negotiating forum and an institutional setting aimed at promoting competition
and specialization through trade. These rules may need modernization
to reflect today's much more integrated and complex international economy. At the same time, governments will need to ensure that the trading
system is not destroyed on the basis of questionable arguments that will
ultimately undermine the capacity of governments to pursue policies
29 Michael Hart explores the trend toward an ever-widening ambit for trade negotiations in
greater detail and outlines some of the challenges to negotiators and researchers posed by these
developments in Michael Hart, After NAFTA: Trade Policy and Research Challengesfor the 1990s,
in NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AREA (william Watson ed., 1992).
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leading to the greater prosperity critical to achieving a whole range of
societal goals, including environmental protection.
The experience in addressing subsidies and product standards shows
how difficult the negotiations of the future will be. In the Tokyo Round
of GATT negotiations (1973-79), governments agreed on procedural
codes aimed at reducing the ability of governments to use subsidies,
countervailing duties and product standards capriciously as barriers to
international trade. The Uruguay Round has sought to take the next
step: agreement on subsidies and standards. This has proven much more
difficult. Similarly, it has proven very difficult to fit rules about intellectual property protection into the framework of GATT rules, because the
underlying goals of intellectual property protection are very different
from those found in the GATT. Rather than reducing discrimination
and increasing competition, intellectual property rules seek to do the
opposite.
There is, of course, international experience in negotiating rules
about the environment or labor. Generally speaking, international agreements on these issues have become largely political and hortatory without the enforcement mechanisms that are central to much more
contractual trade agreements. Thus, while it is recognized that we must
address these difficult issues, we must equally recognize that progress will
be slow and include many false starts and noisy conflicts at home and
abroad. As a start, we need to accept that negotiations will only succeed
if they proceed on the basis of the two themes explored in this paper:
* environment-oriented trade rules should proceed on the basis of
sustainable economic development (i.e., they should be both ecologically and economically sound); and
* they should not undermine the basic principles of the open trading system (i.e., they should build on and clarify existing trading
rules rather than change them).
More specifically, efforts should proceed among environmental experts to reach cooperative solutions to global environmental degradation.
To the extent that such cooperation needs to be enforced by means of
trade instruments, trade experts should ensure that the necessary provisions are included in the trade regime. Such provisions should build on
the basic principles of the GATT, including non-discrimination and
transparency, and should involve the least possible distortion of international trade.
THE ENVIRONMENT AND

NAFTA

The North American free-trade negotiations mark the first time that
environmental considerations have been confronted directly in the context of a major trade negotiation. There are a number of reasons why:
* the appalling environmental and social conditions prevailing on
the Mexican side of the Mexico-U.S. border provide a ready tar-
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get for those opposed to the agreement for both environmental
and other reasons;
* the fact that these conditions could be related directly to a trade
program - the maquiladora program based on U.S. tariff and
Mexican tariff and tax concessions - sharpened calls for addressing environmental issues in the context of the negotiations;
" the concern that lower environmental standards and/or enforcement in Mexico could act as an incentive for pollution-intensive
industries to relocate there as well as offer "unfair" competition to
industries meeting higher levels in Canada and the United States;
" the related concern that lower standards and/or enforcement in
Mexico could either lead to a reduction in standards throughout
the free-trade area or flood the Canadian and U.S. markets with
lower cost and lower standard Mexican products; and
" the general worry that trade agreements lead to more economic
activity at a time when the biosphere needs less economic activity.
Some of these factors had, of course, been present in previous trade
negotiations and had been taken into account. These negotiations, however, mark the first time that a developing country has agreed to negotiate a free-trade agreement with industrialized countries on a fully
reciprocal basis, raising broad concerns about how wide disparity in social, political, environmental and other conditions could be accommodated in the context of a trade agreement. These anxieties were readily
exploited by those opposed to the agreement for other reasons, particularly those worried about competing with low-cost imports. The result
was insistent demands that environmental concerns be addressed in the
agreement. U.S. congressional support for these demands ensured that
NAFTA negotiators would have to pay close attention to this file.
From the outset, all three countries have committed themselves to
ensuring the highest level of cooperation in meeting environmental objectives, both in the agreement for trade-related environmental issues and in
the parallel discussion for broader environmental issues. In all three
countries, the views and concerns of environmental activists have been
actively solicited to ensure that the discussions would be informed and
productive. NAFTA negotiations thus offer a concrete opportunity to
determine how the competing objectives of trade negotiators and environmental regulators can be accommodated within or alongside a trade
agreement.
To set the stage, however, we must first dismiss any notion that
Mexico has any interest in ignoring its environmental problems or in becoming a pollution haven. Mexico is determined to achieve as high a
standard of environmental protection and clean-up as its economic circumstances will allow. The main impediment to moving faster and more
thoroughly is money; a trade agreement offering higher prosperity remains a key ingredient in Mexico's long-term approach to environmental
protection, a point noted by the National Wildlife Federation in the
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United States in its endorsement of the negotiations.3 0
As we have seen, the existing GATT-based international trade regime already provides a good basis upon which to resolve most conflicts
between environmental and trade objectives. The rules, however, are not
perfect and could benefit form clarification. For example, the international community has sought for more than thirty years to reach a consensus on what constitutes a subsidy in order to develop more sensible
rules about which kinds of government practices should be subject to the
discipline of international subsidy rules.3 1 Once agreement is reached on
this central issue, it should prove possible to agree that certain kinds of
government assistance aimed at promoting better environmental practices should be exempt from countervailing duties. Such a provision was
included in the December 1990 Brussels text which was meant to conclude the Uruguay Round of GATT, but disappeared a year later in the
so-called Dunkel text, issued on the authority of the GATT DirectorGeneral and reflecting a further year of negotiations.3 2
NAFTA provides a further opportunity to strengthen and clarify
the existing trade rules along similar lines. As a result, negotiators from
all three countries are seized with the need to meet this objective. Their
efforts are concentrated in three areas:
* ensuring that each country can maintain or create, as necessary,
the highest environmental standards for traded goods compatible
with their domestic requirements and international agreements,
including all technical regulations and related approval procedures affecting human health, safety and the environment;
* improving the GATT-based provisions setting out environmental
exceptions (Article XX: b and g); and
" ensuring that the dispute settlement and institutional provisions
are adequate to the task of resolving conflicts that may arise in the
environmental area.
Once the negotiations are concluded, analysts will need to consider
carefully the extent to which these efforts were successful in advancing
the cause of trade-environment cooperation. At this stage, however, it
must be accepted that the negotiating goals are modest, since neither the
intellectual capital nor negotiating experience is as yet sufficient to go
much further. NAFTA represents, however, an important incremental
step toward gaining both the intellectual capital and negotiating experience necessary for possibly more ambitious negotiations in the future.
30 HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 26, at 131. Hufbauer and Schott provide a detailed account of Mexican environmental laws and policies as well as efforts to improve the enforcement of
these laws. Id. at 135-143.
31 The difficulties encountered in reaching consensus on international rules regarding subsidies
are discussed in MICHAEL HART, CENTRE FOR TRADE POLICY AND LAW, THE CANADA-UNITED
STATES WORKING GROUP ON SUBSIDIES: PROBLEM, OPPORTUNITY OR SOLUTION (Occasional Paper No. 3, 1990).
32 See the draft subsidies code in MTN.TNC/W/.35/Rev 1 (Dec. 3, 1990), at 83-134.

Hart-TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

In addition to devising better rules to resolve potential conflict between trade and environmental goals, environmental concerns affect the
NAFTA negotiations in three other ways:
* Concern has been expressed about Mexico's capacity to enforce
its environmental laws and regulations and the consequent threat
that Mexico could become a pollution haven and a source of unfair competition. Mexico's capacity to enforce its laws, environmental and otherwise, will be enhanced as it becomes more
prosperous. To the extent that NAFTA will increase trade and
other economic opportunities, it should increase Mexico's prosperity and thus its enforcement capacities. Reaching an acceptable level of enforcement can be further enhanced by Canada and
the United States through technical cooperation. By means of
parallel discussions on environmental issues, Canadian and U.S.
environmental officials are working with Mexican officials to find
the most effective ways to provide technical assistance.
e There is broad consensus today that the rapid economic development of the Mexico-U.S. border region through the maquiladora
program placed unacceptable environmental pressures on the region, particularly on its water supplies. This is largely an issue
between the United States and Mexico and is being addressed bilaterally. The United States has to date committed $700 million
and Mexico $500 million to phase one of an extensive clean-up
program. Experts suggest that more may be required. 3
* Both Canada and the United States have committed themselves to
conducting an environmental assessment of the agreement. This
may prove a formidable task. In the case of projects such as
dams, roads and buildings, such a review is relatively straightforward to implement. When it comes to a comprehensive trade
agreement involving changes to potentially several dozen statutes
and even more policies and programs, the task can be complex
and vast. In effect, such an audit seeks to determine the future
impact of a policy instrument that sets out rules about how governments will regulate the conduct of private parties. The
number of possible variations is immense.
Fascination with predicting results is, of course, not limited to
environmental concerns. Economists have long tried to model the
impact of trade agreements on the economy as a whole, on individual sectors and on job creation, usually not with very precise
outcomes. The results of these models tend to be most credible at
high levels of aggregation and become less so as they become
more detailed. Environmental assessments are likely to suffer
form the same basic defect. Nevertheless, NAFTA will provide
33 A range of sensible suggestions on further steps that can be taken to clean up the border
region is offered in HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 26, at 144-146.

CANADA-UNITED

STATES LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18:207 1992

an important opportunity to explore some of the methodological
problems and the limits of what can usefully be done along these
lines.
While technically not part of the formal trade negotiations, all three
issues are linked to them and would not have been pursued in the absence
of the negotiations. A more formal link could be established between the
first two issues and the trade negotiations by means of the preamble to
the trade agreement, as well as by ensuring that the consultation provisions of the agreement can be used to advance environmental cooperation
in both trade-related and other aspects of environmental protection.
The final results of the NAFTA environment discussions are likely
to be modest, for the reasons stated above. Nevertheless, the NAFTA
negotiations mark an important step in the evolution of trade and environmental policy. In the approach they have taken, the three governments have provided important guidance for the future. They have
accepted the legitimacy of addressing environmental issues within the
context of trade negotiation, but they have also indicated that while some
issues are integral to the negotiating agenda, such as standards-setting
rules, others such as technical assistance to improve enforcement of domestic rules can best be addressed in parallel discussions.
CONCLUSIONS

In the years to come, as global economic integration deepens and
awareness of environmental issues intensifies, potential conflicts between
trade and environmental goals and practices are likely to proliferate,
both domestically and internationally. In response, it will be important
that governments develop the necessary tools and policy instruments to
resolve these conflicts equitably and quickly. As this paper has suggested, there is no inherent reason why there need be conflict. Nevertheless, there is scope to improve and strengthen the international legal
framework within which interstate conflict arising out of the
trade/environment interface will need to be addressed. The basic principles enshrined in the GATT provide a sound basis upon which to build.
The NAFTA negotiations provide an opportunity to begin to work out
some of the practical difficulties involved.
The answer to the question posed at the beginning, therefore, is
"yes". Trade negotiators and environmentalists can work together. Indeed, they have already started working, and the results to date are
encouraging.

